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Abstract 
 
 
In this essay I seek to show that a philosophy of modesty informs core aspects of both 
Nietzsche‟s critique of morality and what he intends to replace morality with, namely, an 
ethics of self-cultivation. To demonstrate this I focus on Dawn: Thoughts on the Prejudices of 
Morality, a largely neglected text in his corpus where Nietzsche carries out a quite wide-
ranging critique of morality, including Mitleid.  It is one of Nietzsche‟s most experimental 
works and is best read, I claim, as an Epicurean-inspired critique of the present and an 
exercise in moral therapy.  In the opening sections I draw attention to the wider social 
dimension of the text and its concern with a morality of compassion, which is rarely done in 
the literature. I then turn to highlighting Nietzsche‟s „Epicurean moment‟, followed by two 
sections on Nietzsche on the self in which I aim to bring to light his ethics of self-cultivation 
and show in what ways his revaluation makes central to ethics a modest egoism and care of 
self. In the conclusion to the essay I provide a contrast between Nietzsche and Kant and deal 
with reservations readers might have about his ethics. Overall, the essay seeks to make a 
contribution to an appreciation of Dawn as a work of moral therapy.  
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Beyond Compassion: 
On Nietzsche’s Moral Therapy in Dawn 
 
 
Should not each individual (Individuum) be an attempt to achieve a higher species 
than man through its most individual things? My morality (Moral) would be to take 
the general character of man more and more away from him…to make him to a 
degree non-understandable to others (and with it an object of experiences, of 
astonishment, of instruction for them).
1
  
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Two things of note ought to strike us about the “Nietzsche” of the free spirit period (1878-82), 
which is the focus of my essay.  First, is the extent to which the philosophy is one of modesty: 
this is true of both the kind of work it sets out to do and the goals it sets for its readers as 
ethical subjects.  Second, there is the peculiar character of Nietzsche‟s commitment to ethics.  
Nietzsche at times can appear as rationalist as Kant and yet he wants ethics, involving duties 
one has to oneself and to others, to be something pleasurable (he is in search of the gay or 
joyful science).  Nietzsche has the hope that one day, after much long practice and daily work, 
each of us could say – as an ethical injunction since it can‟t be anything else – “we want to 
become those that we are,”2 not we need or we ought to become this, but that it is our desire, 
something we enjoy and take pleasure and pride in.  The ethical aspiration is towards 
philosophy‟s traditional goals: rational mastery of the affects, autonomy or self-legislation, 
and with a more modern colouring, authenticity.  And yet, much of this, if not all, needs to be 
conceived according to Nietzsche in quite modest terms.  Much of the work of the free spirit 
trilogy is thus devoted to deflating the pretensions of the ego to claims of self-origination; this 
is what Nietzsche exposes as the Oedipal fantasy in which we exist, as it were, as our own 
mother and father.  Although Nietzsche argues against Schopenhauer‟s doctrine on the 
immutability of character, arguing against him that we are not fully developed facts, it 
remains the case that for Nietzsche the liberty we have within our power is a modest and 
                                                 
1
  Nietzsche (1988, volume 9, 6 [158], p. 237).  
 
2
  Nietzsche (1974, section 335).  
 3 
limited one: the liberty we have at our disposal is that of cultivating the drives, not some 
miraculous power of self-invention and self-creation ex nihilo.  
Nietzsche‟s attacks on morality can mislead: as if his aim was to remove us from the 
tasks of morality altogether. In fact, Nietzsche‟s goal is nothing other than a moral one, or 
perhaps it is best to say “ethical”, and for reasons that several later thinkers have argued, such 
as Deleuze and Foucault.
3
 Nevertheless, I would maintain that we should not lose sight of the 
fact that Nietzsche‟s goal is a morality or, if we prefer, ethics of self-cultivation. He wants us 
to learn this skill or art as one that can be taken up by the self, as it works on itself, being as 
much as an aesthetic exercise as an ethical one.  He describes this well in The Gay Science 
290 where he writes of the importance of giving style to one‟s character, and which in our 
own time has been taken over by Foucault, though perhaps with a more fanciful conception of 
the self than Nietzsche would allow.
4
  Nietzsche conceives the work of self-cultivation in 
terms of the gardener stylising nature, rather than some Baudelairean-inspired idea of 
unrestricted, open-ended self-invention.  The task, says Nietzsche, is to cultivate the shoots of 
one‟s drives and affects, which one can do with the good or bad taste of a gardener, and in the 
French or English, or Dutch or Chinese style.
5
  
Perhaps the difficulty for some readers is that Nietzsche presents this becoming-
ethical on our part in such seemingly uninviting terms: we are to remove ourselves from the 
mass of humanity, we need to endure long periods of solitude, we need to resist the 
temptation of the sympathetic affections, and we need to get beyond our compassion.  I want 
to show that Nietzsche has reasons, one‟s integral to his project, to support the mode of 
                                                 
3
  See Deleuze (1988, chapter two); Foucault (1997). For Deleuze whereas „ethics‟ refers to a 
typology of „immanent modes of existence‟, „morality‟ refers existence to otherworldly, 
spiritual, or transcendent values and is the judgment of God or the system of judgment.  Thus 
the transcendent opposition of the values good and evil is replaced by the qualitative 
difference of the modes of existence that we can call good and bad.  As Nietzsche points out, 
to think beyond good and evil does not mean thinking “beyond good and bad.” Nietzsche 
(2006, essay one I, section 17).  
 
4
  See Foucault (1997, p. 262): “From the idea that the self it not given to us, I think that there 
is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art.” For an 
attempt to distinguish Nietzsche from Foucault see Ure (2008, especially pp. 76-7).  
 
5
  Nietzsche (2011, section 560).  
 4 
ethical practice he advocates.  The main claim of the essay is this: Nietzsche‟s campaign or 
polemic against morality begins in earnest in Dawn and it consists in (a) contesting and 
deflating the pretensions of the modern cult of the sympathetic affects, including compassion 
(Mitleid); (b) replacing this with a more modest conception of morality, namely, an ethics of 
self-cultivation.  It is perhaps important to bear in mind what Nietzsche says about the book in 
Ecce Homo:  although it mounts a “campaign” against morality, the reader should not think it 
has about it “the slightest whiff of gunpowder”; rather, the reader should “make out quite 
different and more pleasing scents.” 6  
 
Nietzsche‟s Therapy in Dawn 
 
Nietzsche‟s philosophy is one that has therapeutic ambitions. This is especially the case in the 
texts that make up the free spirit trilogy. In part, Nietzsche conceived the art of the maxim in 
therapeutic terms. The modern age has forgotten the art of reflection or observation, in which 
it is possible to gather maxims “from the thorniest and least gratifying stretches of our lives” 
so as to make ourselves feel better, to give ourselves a lift and a tonic.
7
  We can return to life 
revivified rather than depressed from our encounter with thorny problems, and with “presence 
of mind in difficult situations and amusement in tedious surroundings.”8  There is a need, 
therefore, for modern spirits to learn how to derive pleasure from the art of the maxim, from 
its construction to its tasting.  Nietzsche notes that it is virtually impossible to say whether the 
inquiry into the “human, all too human” will work more as a blessing than a curse to the 
welfare of humanity; at any rate, and for the time being, the issue is undecided.  He further 
notes that because science, like nature, does not aim at final ends, any fruitfulness in the way 
or promoting the utility and welfare of humanity will be the result of science‟s attaining 
something purposeful without having willed it.  But where science is needed now, as part of 
                                                 
6
  Nietzsche (2007, III, „Daybreak‟, section 1).  
 
7
  Nietzsche (1997, section 38).  
 
8
  Nietzsche (1997, section 38).   
 
 5 
general therapeutic practice of reflection and observation, is in cooling down the human mind: 
“shouldn‟t we, the more spiritual human beings of an age that is visibly catching fire in more 
and more places, have to grasp all available means for quenching and cooling, so that we will 
remain at least as steady…and moderate as we are now…” 9  The illnesses and neuroses we 
encounter in humanity require that ice-packs be placed on them.  This concern with a cooling 
down of the human spirit continues in Dawn where Nietzsche‟s concern with the spread of 
fanaticism – especially of moral thinking - is perhaps made more explicit.  
A significant change takes place in Nietzsche‟s thinking with Dawn, which can be 
summarised as follows. In Human, all too Human Nietzsche had essentially been working 
under the influence of Paul Rée and his thinking about morality.  The working assumption of 
Rée‟s approach is that we can give a strictly naturalistic account of morality in which morality 
is seen to be coextensive with the unegoistic instincts or drives.  In short, Rée accepts the 
thesis of Kant and Schopenhauer that for morality to be possible the ego must not be present 
in actions judged to be of moral worth; the difference is that he pursues a naturalistic inquiry 
into this, in large part inspired by evolutionary theory, including Lamarckism and 
Darwinism.
10
  In Human, all too Human (1878) Nietzsche is a psychological egoist and thinks 
“morality” is simply an impossible demand humanity places upon itself.  He borrows the key 
argument from Rée explicitly in the book:  “The moral person,” he writes, quoting from Rée‟s 
On the Origin of Moral Sensations, “does not stand any nearer to the intelligible 
(metaphysical) world than the physical person,” and Nietzsche adds that this is an insight that 
needs to be hardened and sharpened “by the hammerblows of historical knowledge.” 11 By the 
time of Dawn (1881) Nietzsche is adopting a different approach and strategy: why assume 
that “morality” is coextensive with the unegoistic?  Perhaps there are many “moralities” and 
no single moral-making morality.  This is indeed the position he adopts in the text and is what 
allows for his first proper revaluation of values.  The significance of this change in his 
                                                 
9
  Nietzsche (1997, section 38).  
 
10
  See Rée (2003, p. 87 and chapter 1, pp. 89-99).  
 
11
  Nietzsche (1997, section 37).  
 6 
thinking largely explains the change in therapy that is evident in the text:  it‟s no longer 
simply a question of psychological dissection, in which we are not sure whether such 
dissection will be of benefit to humanity or work to its detriment; rather, it is now that 
Nietzsche sees much more fruitful possibilities opening up – new dawns in effect – and he is 
much more “cheerful” about the task of exposing the prejudices or presumptions of morality.   
In his new biography of Nietzsche Julian Young, helpfully I think, describes Dawn as 
a „spiritual resource‟ more than a theoretical treatise; it is a book meant for meditation and 
rumination rather than instant consumption.   He adds that the book does not aim to fulfill this 
purpose in the manner of Eastern philosophy where the aim is to put the intellect out of action. 
As he puts it, “the basis for the work is the use, even the passionate use, of reason.” 12  I am 
interested in the text as an exercise in moral therapy.  As to whether one should look in it for a 
consistent and fully worked out moral philosophy is a difficult question.  It is not that 
Nietzsche is inconsistent or incoherent; it is rather that the text develops what might be called 
trains of thought that sometimes lead to decisive insights but which also leaves much for the 
reader to engage with and to complete. Nietzsche wants his readers to develop an intimate 
relationship with the text. The text has a sense of the future – that new dawns are about to 
break – but much is deliberately left open for the reader‟s rumination.   
Nietzsche‟s thinking aspires to be a practical philosophy. He writes in The Gay 
Science (1882):  “I favour any skepsis to which one can reply:  „let us try it!‟ I do not wish to 
hear anything of all those things and questions that do not permit any experiment.” 13  In 
Dawn he states that we ourselves are experiments and our task should be to want to be such. 
We are to build anew the laws of life and of behaviour by taking from the sciences of 
physiology, medicine, sociology, and solitude the foundation-stones for new ideals if not the 
new ideals themselves. 
14
 As these sciences are not yet sure of themselves we find ourselves 
                                                 
12
  Young (2010, p. 297).  
 
13
  Nietzsche (1974, section 51).  
 
14
  Nietzsche (2011, section 453).  
 
 7 
living in either a preliminary or a posterior existence, depending on our taste and talent, and 
in this interregnum the best strategy is for us to become our own reges (sovereigns) and 
establish small experimental states.  My claim is that we should read such a statement – the 
invocation to live experimentally – in terms of a series of modest proposals Nietzsche is 
making about ethical (re-) formation.  
Nietzsche‟s thinking is best conceived, then, as a philosophy of modesty. In Human, 
All too Human he announced his project as one of “historical philosophizing” and declared 
that its key virtue will be that of “modesty” (Bescheidung) – if everything that there is has 
come to be then there are no eternal facts or absolute truths.
15
  Similarly, in the preface to 
Dawn, where he calls for the “self-overcoming of morality” “out of morality”, Nietzsche 
takes morality to task because he says, our taste prefers “more modest words” (bescheidenere 
Worte).
16
  My contention in this essay is that it is this concern with cultivating modesty which 
informs Nietzsche‟s critique of morality and what he proposes to replace morality with, 
namely, an ethics of self-cultivation. The problem, as we shall see, lies with the presumptions 
of morality which lead us to live in denial of our ethical complexity and the fact that we are 
not the authors of our being in the world (as morality supposes).  Or, at the very least, we 
conceive this in very immodest terms as if we had fantastic powers of self-invention and, 
indeed, of freedom.   
The therapy Nietzsche outlines in Dawn is equally a modest one, made up of “slow 
cures” and “small doses”.  He notes that chronic diseases of the soul, just like those of the 
body, rarely emerge through one-time large offences against the rationality of body and soul, 
but rather through countless undetected little acts of negligence. If this is the case then the 
cure has to be equally subtle and entail countless little offsetting exercises and the unwitting 
cultivation of different habits.
17
  Nietzsche argues that to bring about the most profound 
                                                 
15
  Nietzsche (1997, section 2).  
 
16
  Nietzsche (2011, Preface, section 4).  
 
17
  Nietzsche (2011, section 462).  
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transformation possible it is wisest to administer the means in the smallest doses, but 
unremittingly and over long periods of time.  He is suspicious of those he calls impatient and 
dangerous “political invalids” and claims that no great things can be accomplished at one fell 
swoop. He thus writes: “Thus we want to guard against exchanging head over heels and with 
acts of violence the moral condition we are used to for a new evaluation of things – no, we 
want to keep on living in that condition for a long, long time – until we, very late, presumably, 
become fully aware that the new evaluation has become the predominant force and that the 
small doses of it, to which we will have to grow accustomed from now on, have laid down in 
us a new nature.” 18 
 
The Prejudices and Presumptions of Morality 
 
Throughout Dawn, Nietzsche operates with several critical conceptions of morality. With 
regards to the modern prejudice, which is one of the main foci of his polemic in the book, 
here there is the presumption that we know what actually constitutes morality: “It seems to do 
every single person good these days to hear that society is on the road to adapting the 
individual to fit the needs of the throng and that the individual’s happiness as well as his 
sacrifice consist in feeling himself to be a useful member of the whole…” 19  As Nietzsche 
sees it, then, the modern emphasis is on defining the moral in terms the sympathetic affects 
and compassion (Mitleid).  We can, he thinks, explain the modern in terms of a movement 
towards managing more cheaply, safely, and uniformly individuals in terms of “large bodies 
and their limbs.” This, he says, is the basic moral current of our age: “Everything that in some 
way supports both this drive to form bodies and limbs and its abetting drives is felt to be 
good…” 20 
                                                 
18
  Nietzsche (2011, section 534).  
 
19
  Nietzsche (2011, section 132).  
 
20
  Nietzsche (2011, section 132).  
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 He makes a number of objections to this tendency and drive and they run and recur 
throughout the book.  Let me note some of them.  
 In the presumption that the essence of the moral is to be defined in terms of purely 
other-regarding actions there is lacking appreciation of our ethical complexity and the fact 
that in any action multiple motives might be in play.   For Nietzsche moral motives are 
epistemically opaque, and on this point he is close to Kant.
21
  Kant acknowledges that we can 
never know with absolute certainty the nature of our motives:  we may believe we have 
performed an action out of respect for the moral law but in fact it may have been performed 
out of self-love or some other heteronomous inclination.  Nietzsche adheres to this view 
because for him there are many motives informing any single action and these motives are 
hidden from the agent performing the action. As he indicates in his treatment of Mitleid, it 
may well be that honour, fear, self-defence, or revenge are what moves us to help another 
although we tell ourselves it was an act performed solely for their well-being. As one 
commentator rightly notes, for Nietzsche human nature “has depths and obscurities that make 
it extremely difficult, if not impossible to specify the drives and urges from which our actions 
stem.” 22  We are not transparent to ourselves in Nietzsche‟s view, and when we rely on 
introspection or self-consciousness to discover our motives and intentions we are involved in 
processes of selection and interpretation; that is, we do not simply retrieve so-called “mental 
facts” in such acts.  Rather, we “impose, form, organize, and categorize our inner experiences 
just as we do our outer experiences.” 23  Nietzsche insists that actions are never what they 
appear to be:  “We have expended so much labour on learning that external things are not as 
they appear to us to be – very well! The case is the same with the inner world!” 24   
                                                 
21
  Cartwright (1984, p. 96).  
 
22
  Cartwright (1984, pp. 96-7). 
 
23
  Cartwright (1984, p. 98).   
 
24
  Nietzsche (2011, section 116).  
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In the book Nietzsche devotes a significant number of sections to the topic of Mitleid, 
largely concentrated in book two of the text. His aim is to outline some of the perspectives by 
which we can gain some genuinely reflective insight into the affect of compassion and to 
encourage us to pursue critical lines of inquiry, so Mitleid will be shown to be not a pure 
other-regarding affection, to be an injurious affect, to have value for specific cultures, and so 
on.
25
 His criticism rests on a number of concerns. Let me mention three.  
 
(a) A concern that in extolling compassion as the panacea to our moral anxieties we are in 
danger of existing as fantasists. Nietzsche wonders whether people speak with such idolatry 
about love – the “food of the gods” - simply because they have had so little of it. But would 
not a utopia of universal love be something ludicrous? – “each person flocked around, 
pestered, longed for not by one love…but by thousands, indeed by each and everyone.” 26 
Instead, Nietzsche wants us to favour a future of solitude, quietude, and even being unpopular. 
The imperatives of philosophies of universal love and compassion will serve only to destroy 
us.  If we are tempted by them we should put them to the test and stop all our fantasizing.
27
   
 
(b) A concern that in its cult of the sympathetic affects modern society is in danger of 
providing the image of a single moral-making morality that amounts to a tyrannical 
encroachment on the requirements of individual self-cultivation. In an essay on pity and 
mercy in Nietzsche, Martha Nussbaum notes, correctly in my view, that Nietzsche‟s project is 
one that aims to bring about a revival of Stoic values – self-command and self-formation – 
within a post-Christian and post-Romantic context (she criticizes him for this Stoicism).
28
  
                                                 
25
  See especially Nietzsche 2011 sections 132-38. It is perhaps important to bear in mind that 
in taking to task Mitleid in the ways that he does in these sections of Dawn Nietzsche is 
working with Schopenhauer‟s conception of it where it involves the complete identification 
with the suffering of another.  See Schopenhauer (1995, p. 144).  
 
26
  Nietzsche (2011, section 147).  
 
27
  Nietzsche (2011, section 137).  
 
28
  Nussbaum (1994, p. 140). Nussbaum claims that in his cult of Stoic strength Nietzsche 
depicts “a fearful person, a person who is determined to seal himself off from risk, even at the 
cost of loss of love and value” (1994, p. 160).  Like the otherworldliness he abhors, the 
 11 
The picture frequently presented is one of Nietzsche advocating, in place of an ethics of 
sympathy or compassion, one of idiosyncratic self-assertion or the value of unbridled egoism.  
This is, clearly, a caricature, and fails to capture what we might call the Stoic demands 
Nietzsche places on the self and its cultivation:  harshness toward oneself, self-discipline, 
self-control, honesty, and a profound love of fate.
29
  An important aphorism in this regard is 
139 which runs:  
 
You say that the morality of being compassionate is a higher morality (Moral) than 
that of Stoicism? Prove it! But remember that what is „higher‟ and „lower‟ in morality 
is not, in turn to be measured by a moral yardstick: for there is no absolute morality 
(Moral). So take your rule from somewhere else – and now beware! 30 
 
Here we see Nietzsche contesting the idea that there is a single moral-making morality – he 
never contests the idea that morality is necessary, only that there is a single, absolute 
conception of it.  
 
(c) A concern that the metaphysical estimation of Mitleid by Schopenhauer – namely, that 
through Mitleid we pierce the veil of Maya and discover that all is One and “this art thou” - is 
psychologically naïve and without penetration. In Dawn 142 Nietzsche refers to 
Schopenhauer‟s account of a “mystical process” by which Mitleid makes two beings into one 
and describes it as “rapturous and worthless poppycock” (schwärmerischen und 
                                                                                                                                            
Stoicism he endorses is a form of self-protection, expressing “a fear of this world and its 
contingencies” (ibid.).  This picture of Nietzsche does not tally with the stress we find placed 
in Dawn on the need for the individual that wishes to become sovereign to take risks and to 
experiment. We will grow, Nietzsche stresses, only by experiencing dissatisfaction with 
ourselves and assuming the risk of experimenting in life, freely taking the journey through our 
wastelands, quagmires, and icy glaciers. The ones who don‟t take the risk of life, he says, will 
never make the journey around the world that they themselves are, but will remain trapped 
within themselves like a knot on the log they were born to, a mere happenstance (2011, 
section 343). The figure Nussbaum esteems over Nietzsche is Rousseau, who is prized for his 
“eloquent writings on pity” (1994, p. 140) and whose thinking lies at the basis of 
“democratic-socialist thinking” (1994, p. 159). For an intelligent response to some of 
Nussbaum‟s concerns over Nietzsche on Mitleid, see von Tevenar (2007); for criticisms of 
Rousseau on pity see Boyd (2004) and Ure (2006).  For Nussbaum‟s criticism of Nietzsche‟s 
Stoicism see also Nussbaum (2001, p. 362 and p. 384).   
 
29
  See Elveton (2004, p. 193).  
 
30
  Nietzsche (2011, section 139).  
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nichtswürdigen Krimskrams).
31
  For Nietzsche it is simply not the case that we ever act from 
single motive.  If we wish to free ourselves from our suffering in acts of Mitleid, which is 
what he thinks is taking place, it is also the case, Nietzsche surmises, that with the same act 
we surrender to an impulse for pleasure, for example, in the thought of praise and gratitude 
which will come our way if we were to come to someone‟s aid.  The performer of the act can 
thus take a delight in himself, for example, in the sensation that the action has put an end to an 
injustice that arouses one‟s indignation – the release of this indignation can have an 
invigorating effect. Once again, as is so typical of his middle period writings, Nietzsche is 
asking for psychological probity when it comes to analysing moral matters and what is said to 
constitute the moral: 
  
That compassion…should be of the same ilk as the suffering in view of which it arises 
or that compassion possesses an especially keen and penetrating understanding of that 
suffering, both these claims are contradicted by experience, and anyone who has 
glorified compassion based on just these two aspects lacked sufficient experience in 
precisely this domain of the moral.
32
  
 
 
 
In and of itself Mitleid has as little good character as any other drive: it is only when it is 
extolled – which happens when we fail to apprehend what is injurious about it and discover in 
it instead a source of pleasure – that a good conscience attaches itself to it, and only then does 
one surrender to it readily and not shy away from the impulse.
33
  In conditions, such as 
existed in Greek culture, when its injurious character is apprehended, it is considered a 
weakness; it is a “pathological recurring affect, the danger of which one can remove by 
                                                 
31
  Schopenhauer notes that when one person connects with another through compassion what 
they have done, in effect, is to have pierced the veil of Maya, that is, they have broken the 
spell of individuation and now can see that “all is One.”  This is why Schopenhauer says that 
virtue is “practical mysticism” that springs from the same knowledge that constitutes the 
essence of all mysticism.  For Schopenhauer, metaphysics is virtue translated into action and 
proceeds from the immediate and intuitive knowledge of the identity of all beings.  See 
Schopenhauer (1969, volume one, p. 373).  
 
32
  Nietzsche (2011, section 133).  
 
33
  Nietzsche (2011, section 134).  
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temporary, voluntary discharges”. 34 Nietzsche is not arguing against the idea that physicians 
of humanity are needed or that humanity does not suffer; rather, his point is that to be a proper 
physician to humanity one needs to be cautious with regard to the sentiment of compassion 
otherwise we will be lamed in all the decisive moments and our knowledge and benevolent 
hand will be paralyzed.   
Nietzsche suggests that a culture of compassion could be a very destructive culture; in 
fact he thinks humankind would perish from it if it became the norm for a day; we might 
grow sick of it because of feeling so sick about ourselves.  Our inability to digest and cope 
with life‟s experiences and their severities will induce us to become deeply melancholic. 
There is a need for us, then, to become much more subtle in our appreciation of this moral 
affect. Mitleid is an affect which, like any other, needs to be brought under control and sifted 
by reason; otherwise it is as dangerous as any other affect. 
35
   
Nietzsche treats Mitleid as a psychological malaise and as a sociological phenomenon 
of modernity,
36
 and the two are intermingled in his account in Dawn.  For Nietzsche, then, the 
principal prejudice that holds sway in the Europe of his day is that the sympathetic affects 
define the essence of the moral, such as actions deemed to be congenial, disinterested, of 
general utility, and so on.  He also thinks we are busy building a society of “security” in 
which the chief goal is to protect individuals from various hazards of life and so reduce 
human suffering and conflict. In Dawn Nietzsche‟s focus is not, as is widely supposed, on 
Christianity as the religion of pity or compassion – he maintains that until the eighteenth 
century such a virtue was a subsidiary and nonessential aspect of this religion. He then 
inquires into the source of the feeling that morality consists in disinterested, useful, and 
congenial actions and claims that it is the effect and change of heart wrought upon Europe by 
Christianity, even though this was neither its intention nor its teaching.  Rather, the view that 
                                                 
34
  Nietzsche (2011, section 134).  
 
35
   Nietzsche (1968, section 928). In this note Nietzsche writes that “greatness of character” 
consists in possessing the affects to the highest degree but also having them under control.   
 
36
  Ure (2006, p. 81).  
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morality means nothing other than disinterested, useful, and congenial actions is the residuum 
of Christian sentiments once the strictly egotistical, foundational belief in the importance of 
eternal personal salvation, and the dogmas on which this belief rested, receded and there then 
came into the foreground ancillary beliefs in love and love thy neighbour which harmonized 
with ecclesiastical charity.  There emerges in modernity a cult of love for humanity and the 
idea of surpassing the Christian ideal became, “a secret spur of all French freethinkers from 
Voltaire through to August Comte”, for example, the latter‟s moral formula of “vivre pour 
autrui” (live for others).37 
Nietzsche‟s main target in the book, then, is what he sees as the fundamental 
tendency of modern “commercial society” and its attempt at a “collectivity-building project 
that aims at disciplining bodies and selves and integrating them into a uniform whole”.38  
Here “morality” denotes the means of adapting the individual to the needs of the whole, 
making him a useful member of society. This requires that every individual is made to feel, as 
its primary emotion, a connectedness or bondedness with the whole, with society, in which 
anything truly individual is regarded as prodigal, costly, inimical, extravagant, and so on.  
Nietzsche‟s great worry is that genuine individuality and a healthy concern with self-
fashioning will be sacrificed and this, in large part, informs his critique of what he sees as the 
cult of sympathetic affects within modernity.   
 
Nietzsche‟s critique of commercial society 
 
For Nietzsche it is necessary to contest the idea that there is a single moral-making morality 
since every code of ethics that affirms itself in an exclusive manner “destroys too much 
valuable energy and costs humanity much too dearly.” 39 In the future, Nietzsche hopes, the 
inventive and fructifying person shall no longer be sacrificed and “numerous novel 
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experiments shall be made in ways of life and modes of society.” 40 When this takes place we 
will find that an enormous load of guilty conscience has been purged from the world. 
Humanity has suffered for too long from teachers of morality who wanted too much all at 
once and sought to lay down precepts for everyone.
41
  In the future, care will need to be given 
to the most personal questions and create time for them.
42
 Small individual questions and 
experiments are no longer to be viewed with contempt and impatience.
43
  In place of what he 
sees as the ruling ethic of sympathy, which he thinks can assume the form of a “tyrannical 
encroachment,” Nietzsche invites individuals to engage in self-fashioning, cultivating a self 
that others can look at with pleasure:  
 
 
Moral fashion of a commercial society – Behind the fundamental principle of the 
contemporary moral fashion: “moral actions are generated by sympathy (Sympathie) 
for others,” I see the work of a collective drive toward timidity masquerading behind 
an intellectual front: this drive desires…that life be rid of all the dangers it once held 
and that each and every person should help toward this end with all one‟s might: 
therefore only actions aimed at the common security and at society‟s sense of security 
may be accorded the rating “good!” – How little pleasure people take in themselves 
these days, however, when such a tyranny of timidity dictates to them the uppermost 
moral law (Sittengesetz), when, without so much as a protest, they let themselves be 
commanded to ignore and look beyond themselves and yet have eagle-eyes for every 
distress and every suffering existing elsewhere! Are we not, with this prodigious 
intent to grate off all the rough and sharp edges from life, well on the way to turning 
humanity into sand?...In the meantime, the question itself remains open as to whether 
one is more useful to another by immediately and constantly leaping to his side and 
helping him – which can, in any case, only transpire very superficially, provided the 
help doesn‟t turn into a tyrannical encroachment and transformation – or by 
fashioning out of oneself something the other will behold with pleasure, a lovely, 
peaceful, self-enclosed garden, for instance, with high walls to protect against the 
dangers and dust of the roadway, but with a hospitable gate as well. 
44
 (D 174).   
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The perspective Nietzsche adopts here on “commercial society” – he appears to have 
encountered the term in Hippolyte Taine
45
 - is perhaps a little odd since we typically associate 
it with an ethic of selfishness and pride.  However, I think it is clear that in this section 
Nietzsche is expressing an anxiety that other nineteenth century social analysts, such as 
Tocqueville, have, namely, that market-driven atomization and de-individuation can readily 
lead to a form of communitarian tyranny.
46
  We are today creating a society of “universal 
security” but the price being paid of it is, Nietzsche thinks, much too high: “the maddest thing 
is that what is being effected is the very opposite of universal security.” 47 We live within the 
effect of general opinions about the “human being,” which is a “bloodless abstraction” and 
“fiction.” 48 Even the modern glorification of work and talk of its blessings can be interpreted 
as a fear of everything individual.  The subjection to hard industriousness from early until late 
serves as “the best policeman” since it keeps everyone in bounds and hinders the development 
of reason, desire, and the craving for independence.  It uses vast amounts of nervous energy 
which could be given over to reflection, brooding, dreaming, loving and hating and working 
through our experiences: “…a society in which there is continuous hard work will have more 
security: and security is currently worshipped as the supreme divinity.” 49    
 Perhaps Nietzsche‟s fundamental presupposition in the book is that ours is an age of 
great uncertainty in which there is emerging individuals who no longer consider themselves to 
be bound by existing mores and laws and are thus making the first attempts to organize and 
create for themselves a right.  Hitherto such individuals have lived their lives under the 
jurisdiction of a guilty conscience, being decried as criminals, freethinkers, and immoralists.
50
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Although this development will make the coming century a precarious one (it may mean, 
Nietzsche notes, that a rifle hangs on each and every shoulder), it is one that Nietzsche thinks 
we should find fitting and good since it at least insures the presence of an oppositional power 
that will admonish that there is any such thing as a single moral-making morality.   
 
An Epicurean Moment 
 
In Dawn, then, Nietzsche is ploughing his own field and he knows well the charge that will be 
levelled against him:  indulging in immoral cultural Epicureanism.  Indeed, at this time he 
was inspired by Epicurus‟s conception of friendship and the ideal of withdrawing from 
society and cultivating one‟s own garden.51 In a letter to Peter Gast of 1883 Nietzsche writes 
that Epicurus, “is the best negative argument in favour of my challenge to all rare spirits to 
isolate themselves from the mass of their fellows.” 52  If philosophical therapeutics is centred 
on a concern with the healing of our own lives so as to return us to the joy of existing,
53
 then 
in the texts of his middle period, including Dawn, Nietzsche can be seen to be an heir to this 
ancient tradition.  The difference is that he is developing a therapy for the sicknesses of the 
soul under modern conditions of social control and discipline.  Nevertheless, it is the case that 
Nietzsche at this time is seeking to revive an ancient conception of philosophy. In a note from 
1881 he states that he considers the various moral schools of antiquity to be “experimental 
laboratories” containing a number of recipes for the art of living and holds that these 
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experiments now belong to us as our legitimate property: “we shall not hesitate to adopt a 
Stoic recipe just because we have profited in the past from Epicurean recipes.” 54    
Nietzsche admits at this time to being inspired by the example of Epicurus whom he 
calls one of the greatest human beings to have ever graced the earth and the inventor of a 
“heroic-idyllic mode of philosophizing.” 55 In Dawn Epicurus is portrayed as the enemy of the 
idea of punishments in Hell after death. Nietzsche suggests that the triumph of Epicurus‟s 
teaching resounds most beautifully in the mouth of the sombre Roman Lucretius but comes 
too early. Christianity takes over the belief in “subterranean terrors” under its special 
protection and this foray into heathendom enables it to carry the day over the popularity of the 
Mithras and Isis cults, winning to its side the rank of the timorous as the most zealous 
adherents of the new faith (Nietzsche notes that because of the extent of the Jews‟ attachment 
to life such an idea fell on barren ground).  However, the teaching of Epicurus triumphs anew 
in the guise of modern science which has rejected “any other representation of death and any 
life beyond it.” 
56
 Nietzsche describes Epicurus as “the soul-soother (Seelen-Beschwichtiger) 
of later antiquity” who had the wonderful insight that to quieten our being it is not necessary 
to have resolved the ultimate and outermost theoretical questions.
57
  To those who are 
tormented by the fear of the gods, one points out that if the gods exist they do not concern 
themselves with us and that it is unnecessary to engage in fruitless disputation over the 
ultimate question as to whether they exist or not. Furthermore, in response to the 
consideration of a hypothesis, half belonging to physics and half to ethics, and that may cast 
gloom over our spirits, it is wise to refrain from refuting the hypothesis and instead offer a 
rival hypothesis, even a multiplicity of hypotheses.  To someone who wishes to offer 
consolation – for example, to the unfortunate, to ill-doers, to hypochondriacs, and so on – one 
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can call to mind two pacifying formulae of Epicurus that are capable of being applied to many 
questions: “firstly, if that is how things are they do not concern us; secondly, things may be 
thus but they may also be otherwise.” 58  Nietzsche is keen, then, to have his readers follow 
the example of Epicurus and encourage them to cultivate an attitude towards existence in 
which they accept their mortality and attain a new serenity about their dwelling on the earth, 
to conquer unjustified fears, and to reinstitute the role played by chance and chance events in 
the world and in human existence.
59
  As Pierre Hadot notes, for the Epicurean sage the world 
is the product of chance, not divine intervention, and this brings with it pleasure and peace of 
mind, freeing him from an unreasonable fear of the gods and allowing him to consider each 
moment as an unexpected miracle. Each moment of existence can be greeted with immense 
gratitude.
60
   
It‟s from Epicurus, then, that Nietzsche gets the inspiration to give up on what he 
calls the first and last things, the questions of a theologically-inspired metaphysics, and 
devote attention to the closest things.  Nietzsche has made this decision in 1878-9 and it 
provides the context for much of what it follows in the free spirit trilogy.  Let me outline 
some of its features.   
In modern culture we can detect, Nietzsche writes, a “feigned disrespect for all the 
things which human beings in fact take most seriously, for all the things closest to them.” 61   
As Ruth Abbey notes, in devaluing the small, worldly matters Christian and post-Christian 
sensibility, “puts people at war with themselves and forbids a close study of which forms of 
care of the self would be most conducive to individual flourishing.” 62 As Nietzsche notes, 
most people see the closest things badly and rarely pay heed to them, whilst “almost all the 
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physical and psychical frailties of the individual derive from this lack...being 
unknowledgeable in the smallest and everyday things and failing to keep an eye on them - this 
it is that transforms the earth for so many into a „vale of tears.”‟ 63  Our understanding of 
existence is diverted away from the smallest and closest things:  
 
Priests and teachers, and the sublime lust for power of idealists of every 
description…hammer even into children that what matters is something quite 
different: the salvation of the soul, the service of the state, the advancement of 
science, or the accumulation of reputation and possessions, all as the means of doing 
service to mankind as a whole; while the requirements of the individual, his great and 
small needs within the twenty four hours of the day, are to be regarded as something 
contemptible or a matter of indifference.
64
  
 
 
Nietzsche goes on here to name here Socrates as a key figure in the history of thought who 
defended himself against this “arrogant neglect” of the individual for the benefit of the human 
race.
65
 In Dawn 435 Nietzsche notes that our greatness does not crumble away all at once but 
through continual neglect: 
 
…the little vegetation that grows in between everything and understands how to cling 
everywhere, this is what ruins what is great in us – the quotidian, hourly pitifulness of 
our environment that goes overlooked, the thousand tiny tendrils of this or that small 
and small-minded feeling growing out of our neighborhood, our job, the company we 
keep, the division of our day. If we allow these small weeds to grow unwittingly, then 
unwittingly they will destroy us! 
66
(D 435) 
 
 
The closest things are those things which are overlooked or even disparaged by priests and 
metaphysicians who devote all their time and energy to the care of the soul. They include 
things like eating and diet, housing, clothing, and social intercourse. These should all be made 
the object of constant impartial and general reflection and reform.  Nietzsche argues: “Our 
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continual offences against the most elementary laws of the body and the spirit reduce us 
all…to a disgraceful dependence and bondage…on physicians, teachers and curers of soul 
who lie like a burden on the whole of society.” 67  All the physical and psychical frailties of 
the individual derive from a lack of knowledge about the smallest and most everyday things, 
such as what is beneficial to us and what is harmful to us in the institution of our mode of life, 
in the division of the day, eating, sleeping, and reflecting, and so on.  
Nietzsche insists that we do not require certainties with regard to the “first and last 
things” - what he calls “the furthest horizon” - in order to live a “full and excellent human 
life.” 68  He proposes a fundamental rupture be affected with regard to customary habits of 
thinking.  In the face of questions such as, what is the purpose of man?  What is his fate after 
death? How can man be reconciled with God?, it should not be felt necessary to develop 
knowledge against faith; rather we should practise an indifference towards faith and supposed 
knowledge in the domains of metaphysics and religion. He proposes the following as a 
principle of the new life:  “life should be ordered on the basis of what is most certain and 
most demonstrable, not as hitherto on that what is most remote, indefinite, and no more than a 
cloud on the horizon.” 69 
This concern with the small things and “casuistry of selfishness” continues well into 
the late Nietzsche, with Nietzsche writing in Ecce Homo that “nutrition, place, climate, 
recreation” are “inconceivably more important than everything one has taken to be important 
to date,” and here it is necessary that we relearn.70   
 
Nietzsche on the Drives and the Self 
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We are not, as we may like to suppose, the fantastical authors or agents of our own 
experiences since we are subject to the play of drives and this for Nietzsche is a worryingly 
contingent business.  One difficulty we encounter in developing an adequate understanding of 
inner processes and drives is language and the prejudices on which it is based. Nietzsche 
notes that words exists only for superlative degrees of such processes and drives and when 
words are not available to us we tend not to engage any longer in precise observation. “Wrath, 
hate, love, compassion, joy, pain,” and so on are all names for extreme states, whilst the 
milder middle degrees, as well as the lower ones which are constantly in play, “elude us and 
yet it is precisely they that weave the web of our character and our destiny.” 71 We are not, 
then, good readers of ourselves: 
 
We are none of us what we appear to be solely in those states for which we have 
consciousness and words – and hence praise and censure; we misconstrue ourselves 
according to these cruder outbursts, which are the only ones we register; we draw a 
conclusion from material in which the exceptions outweigh the rule, we misread 
ourselves in this seemingly clearest block print of the self (Selbst). 
72
  
 
 
The irony is that it is through our opinions and valuations of ourselves, which we have arrived 
at through this mistaken route, that we form our so-called “ego” (Ich) and this collaborates 
from now on in the formation of our character and destiny (Schicksal). 
In his exploration of the drives Nietzsche notes that no matter how much we struggle 
for self-knowledge nothing is more incomplete to us than the image of the totality of our 
drives.  It is not only that we cannot call the cruder ones by name, but also more worryingly 
that their number and strength, their ebb and flow, their play and counter play, and most of all 
the laws of their alimentation remain completely unknown to us:   
 
This alimentation thus becomes the work of chance: our daily experiences toss willy-
nilly to this drive or that drive some prey or other which it seizes greedily, but the 
whole coming and going of these events exists completely apart from any meaningful 
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connection to the alimentary needs of the sum drives: so that the result will always be 
two-fold: the starving and stunting of some drives and the overstuffing of others.
73
   
 
 
Our experiences, then, are types of nourishment; the problem is that there is lack of 
knowledge on our part as to the character of our experiences. The result is that we live as 
contingent beings:   
 
…as a consequence of this contingent alimentation of the parts, the whole, the fully-
grown polyp turns out to be a creature no less contingent (Zufälliges) than its 
maturation.
74
 
 
 
Nietzsche notes that this insight would be more transparent to us if all the drives wanted to 
take matters as seriously as does the drive for hunger. He then develops an insight onto our 
dreams and how they serve to compensate the drives for a contingent absence of nourishment 
during the day.   One dream may be full of tenderness and tears, another on a different day 
playful and high-spirited, whilst other ones may be adventurous or full of melancholy.  It is 
through the invention going on in dreams – the make-believe – that we give discharge and 
free rein to our different and manifold drives.  These are free and arbitrary interpretations of 
our nerve impulses during sleep, as well as of movements of blood and intestines, of the 
pressure of an arm or of the bedclothes, of the sounds from a bell tower, and so on. Given that 
this “text,” as Nietzsche calls it, remains pretty much the same from evening to evening, why 
does it elicit from our dreams such divergent commentary?  His answer is that the “make-
believing faculty” of reason (die dichtende Vernunft) is imagining each different day 
divergent causes for the same nerve impulse and in accordance with the fact that different 
drives seek to gratify themselves.  One day this particular drive is at high tide, on another day 
a different drive is surging.  Nietzsche rightly notes that in contrast to dreaming, waking life 
does not enjoy the same freedom of interpretation since it is less poetic and unbridled. 
Nevertheless this fact should not serve to deceive us:  when we are in a waking state our 
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drives also interpret nerve impulses and ascribe causes to them and in accordance with the 
needs of our drives. On this level, then, Nietzsche contends that there is no essential 
difference between wakefulness and dreaming states.
75
 This suggests to him that our 
consciousness may be nothing other than a “fantastical commentary on an unknown, perhaps 
unknowable, yet felt text.” 76 Nietzsche concludes by suggesting that to experience is, 
therefore, to make believe or invention.   
 How, then, is autonomy or self-mastery to be achieved?  Nietzsche has a twofold 
answer: (a) one practices the passion of knowledge, treating oneself as a site of experimental 
self-knowledge; (b) one exercises an intellectual conscience, a superior form of conscience, or 
the conscience behind one‟s conscience.  One need not practise any of this in a spirit of 
renunciation. Nietzsche expresses an opposition to any ethic that would draw its inspiration 
from the negative virtues. He says that he abhors every morality that says “Do this! Renounce! 
Overcome yourself!”  What he is well disposed towards, he continues, is a morality that 
impels you to do something “again and again from morning till evening, and to dream of it at 
night‟, but to think of nothing else other than doing it well, „as well as I alone can.” 77 When 
we live this way, he says, the things that do not belong to such a life drop off without hate or 
reluctance.  The task, then, is not to strive for an impoverishment of our lives with open eyes, 
as the negative virtues teach. Rather, we should fix our eye forwards, not sideways, 
backwards, or downwards, and in living like this we will not even notice those things in our 
lives that have taken their leave. Nietzsche invites us to reflect on the history of our every day 
by considering the habits it is made up of: are they the product of innumerable little 
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cowardices and lazinesses or of our courage and innovative reason?  Those who are thirsty for 
reasons and knowledge want to face their experiences as sternly as a scientific experiment, 
hour by hour and day by day.  They want to be their own experiments and guinea-pigs.  To 
justify that we have done the right action, one that we can label as moral, we often appeal to 
our conscience.  But this is to assume that our conscience is infallible and that it always 
speaks morally to us.  Do we not require then another conscience to assess the adequacy of 
this belief, such as an intellectual conscience? Any judgement we make that “this is right” has 
a prehistory in our drives, inclinations, aversions, and experiences to date, including what we 
have failed to experience.  As Nietzsche points out, there are many different ways that we can 
listen to our conscience, and the inadequate way lies in relying upon the firmness of our moral 
judgement simply because this firmness could be evidence of our personal abjectness or lack 
of a personality.  Moreover, our so-called moral strength might have its source in our 
stubbornness or in our inability to envisage new ideals.
78
   
In a note from autumn 1880 he insists that the intellect is the tool of our drives, “it is 
never free.”  What it does is to sharpen itself in the struggle with various drives and thereby 
refines the activity of each individual drive.  But he also insists that: “The will to power (der 
Wille nach Macht), to the infallibility (Unfehlbarkeit) of our person, resides in our greatest 
justice and integrity (Redlichkeit): scepticism just applies to all authority, we do not want to 
be duped, not even by our drives! But what does not want? A drive, certainly!” 79 So, for 
Nietzsche we are acquiring a new set of drives, including the drive to independence and even 
the passion of knowledge will become a drive.  At work in Nietzsche we see an ethic of 
“individualization” which: (a) is a form of perfecting oneself through quite radical 
independence, entailing long periods of solitude; (b) requires constant and intense self-
observation and of the circumstances and situations one finds oneself in.
80
 As one 
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commentator notes: “…autonomy must always be a work in progress: a subject begins in 
heteronomy and becomes increasingly autonomous as more of her drives and affects are 
endorsed reflexively and integrated into her overall character.” 81   
The focus, then, is on the drives in which the self is not conceived metaphysically for 
there is no self independent of the structuring and organisation of the drives.  For Nietzsche 
what we call the “self” just is a site or agent of structuring, ordering, and organising. If free 
spirits aspire to a new condition of freedom this is because a new drive has become dominant 
within them and expresses itself as a “task” (Aufgabe), which Nietzsche compares to an 
“unconscious pregnancy.” 82 The actual “philosophy” one comes up with may itself be 
nothing other than a sublimation and refinement, even a release, of the drives. Thus, 
Nietzsche admits in Dawn that his philosophy is, at bottom, an instinct for a personal diet and 
hygiene, one that suits a particular taste and for whom it alone is beneficial. This is an instinct 
that that is searching for its own air, its own heights, its own weather, its own type of health, 
and through the detour of his head.  He states: “There are many other and certainly more 
loftier sublimities (höhere Erhabenheiten) of philosophy and not just those that are more 
gloomy and more ambitious than mine – perhaps they too are, each and every one, nothing 
other than intellectual detours for these kinds of personal drives? –” 83  
 
 
Nietzsche and Care of Self 
 
 
Nietzsche concludes book two of Dawn by offering a “counter-calculation.”  If only those 
actions which are performed solely and only for the sake of another are said to be moral then 
there are no moral actions; similarly, if only those actions which are performed out of “free 
will” are held to be moral then there are no moral actions (here Nietzsche is supposing free 
will in the sense of some miraculous act of self-causation).  He concludes: 
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We return to humanity the healthy courage for, and the good cheer of, those actions 
decried as egoistical and restore to them their value – we deprive them of their guilty 
conscience!  And since till now these actions have been by far the most frequent sort 
and will continue to be so for all time to come, we thus relieve the entire tableau of 
actions and existence of its evil appearance!  This is a very great outcome!  If 
humanity no longer considers itself evil, it will cease to be so! 
84
 
 
So, Nietzsche, it seems clear, wishes to restore a good conscience to egoism and to encourage 
his readers to practice a care of self.  And it is also clear, I would contend, that Nietzsche is 
not in Dawn advocating the overcoming of all possible forms of morality. Where morality 
centres on “continual self-command and self-overcoming…in great things and in the smallest,” 
he champions it.
85
  His concern is that “morality” in the forms it has assumed in the greater 
part of human history, right up to Kant‟s moral law, has opened up an abundance of sources 
of displeasure and to the point that one can say that with every “refinement in morality” 
(Sittlichkeit) human beings have grown “more and more dissatisfied with themselves, their 
neighbour, and their lot…” 86  The individual in search of happiness, and who wishes to 
become its own lawgiver, cannot be treated with prescriptions to the path to happiness simply 
because individual happiness springs from one‟s own unknown laws and external 
prescriptions only serve to obstruct and hinder it: “The so-called „moral‟ precepts are, in truth, 
directed against individuals and are in no way aimed at promoting their happiness.” 87 Indeed, 
Nietzsche himself does not intend to lay down precepts for everyone.  As he writes, “One 
should seek out limited circles and seek and promote the morality appropriate to them.”88   
The morality that humanity has cultivated and dedicated itself to is one of 
“enthusiastic devotion” and “living for others” in which it looks down from sublime heights 
on the more sober morality of self-control (which is regarded as egotistical).  Nietzsche 
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suggests the reason why morality has been developed in this way is owing to the enjoyment 
of the state of intoxication which has stemmed from the thought that the person is at one with 
the powerful being to whom it consecrates itself; in this way “the feeling of power” is enjoyed 
and is confirmed by a sacrifice of the self. For Nietzsche such an overcoming of the self is 
impossible: “In truth you only seem to sacrifice yourselves; instead, in your thoughts you 
transform yourselves into gods and take pleasure in yourselves as such.” 89  
In examining the inflated character of moral thinking and language Nietzsche is 
dealing with a problem that preoccupies him in his middle period: the problem of fanaticism. 
As he notes at one point in the text, such “enthusiasts” will seek to implant the faith in 
intoxication “as the life within life: a terrible faith!” 90  Such is the extent of Nietzsche‟s 
anxiety that he wonders whether humanity as a whole will one day perish by its spiritual fire-
waters and by those who keep alive the desire for them.  The “strange madness of moral 
judgements” is bound up with states of exaltation and “the most exalted language.” 91    
Nietzsche appeals to the Stoic Epictetus for an example of a non-fanatical mode of 
living and as a counterweight to modern idealists who are greedy for expansion. Epictetus‟s 
ideal human being, lacking all fear of God and believing strictly in reason, “is not a preacher 
of penitence.” 92 Although this ancient thinker was a slave, the exemplar he invokes is without 
class and is possible in every class.  Epictetus is also admired by Nietzsche on account of his 
dedication to his own ego and for resisting the glorification of thinking and living for others.
93
 
Of course, this is a partial and selective appropriation of Epictetus on Nietzsche‟s part. 
Although his chief concerns are with integrity and self-command, Epictetus is also known for 
his Stoic cosmopolitanism in which individuals have an obligation to care for their fellow 
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human beings, and Nietzsche is silent about this aspect of Stoic teaching.
94
 Nevertheless, it is 
true that the ethical outlook of Epictetus does invite people “to value their individual selves 
over everything else,” 95 and for Nietzsche he serves as a useful contrast to Christian thinkers 
such as Pascal, who considered the ego to be something hateful: 
 
 
If, as Pascal and Christianity claim, our ego (Ich) is always hateful, how might we 
possibly ever allow or assume that someone else could love it – be it God or a human 
being! It would go against all decency to let oneself be loved knowing full well that 
one only deserves hate – not to mention other feelings of repulsion. - „But this is 
precisely the kingdom of mercy‟. – So is your love-thy-neighbour mercy? Your 
compassion mercy? Well, if these things are possible for you, go still one step further: 
love yourselves out of mercy – then you won‟t need your God any more at all, and 
the whole drama of original sin and redemption will play itself out to the end in you 
yourselves. 
96
  
 
 
Part of Nietzsche‟s hostility towards “morality” stems from what he regards as the anti-
naturalism of moral concepts and thinking, as when he writes that what he wants is to stop 
making causes into sinners and consequences into executioners.
97
 A “moral” interpretation of 
the body and its affects blocks off the securing of naturalistically informed self-knowledge 
and generates a psychical suffering peculiar to it, as when Nietzsche writes of Pascal who 
construed whatever proceeded from the stomach, the entrails, the nerves, the gall, and the 
semen – “the whole contingent nature of the machine we know so little!” – as a moral and 
religious phenomenon in which one could ask whether God or devil, good or evil, salvation or 
damnation was to be discovered in them.
98
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Nietzsche wishes to replace morality, including the morality of compassion, with a 
care of self. We go wrong when we fail to attend to the needs of the “ego” and flee from it: 
 
Let‟s stick to the idea that benevolence and beneficence are what constitute a good 
person; only let‟s add: “provided that he is first benevolently and beneficently 
disposed towards himself!” For without this – if he runs from himself, hates himself, 
causes injury to himself – he is certainly not a good person. Because he is rescuing 
himself from himself in others…to run from the ego (ego) and to hate it and to live in 
others, for others – has, heretofore, been called, just as unreflectedly as assuredly, 
“unegotistical” and consequently “good”! 99  
 
 
However, with respect to the ego it is clear that Nietzsche wants us to start cultivating what 
we might call a modest egoism. As he writes in a note of 1884, “Egoism! But no one has yet 
asked: what kind of ego?” 100  And as he puts it in a note from 1881, “Stop feeling oneself as 
this phantastic ego!...Discover the errors of the ego!...Get beyond „me‟ and „you‟! Learn to 
feel (empfinden) cosmically!” 101  This, I take it, is a Stoic reference and sentiment that 
Nietzsche is expressing: the idea is to give up the childish habit of regarding oneself as the 
centre of the world and view oneself as a singular moment in a rational cosmos.
102
 As 
Epictetus puts it in book two of his Discourses, “I am a human being, a part of the whole, like 
an hour in a day.”103   
In section 128 of Dawn Nietzsche seeks to indicate that the desire to be our own 
author has its psychological roots in a narcissistic desire to experience oneself as all-
powerful.
104
  He draws on the myth of Oedipus to make his point: 
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You wish to take responsibility for everything!  Only not for your dreams!  What 
miserable frailty, what poverty in the courage of your convictions!  Nothing is more 
your own than your dreams! Nothing more your work!  Content, form, duration, actor, 
spectator – in these comedies you yourselves are everything!  And this is just the 
place in yourselves you shun and are ashamed of, and even Oedipus, the wise 
Oedipus, knew how to derive consolation from the idea that we cannot do anything 
about what it is we dream!  I conclude from this: that the vast majority of human 
beings must be aware that they have abhorrent dreams.  Were it otherwise: how 
greatly this nocturnal poeticizing would have been plundered to bolster human 
arrogance! – Do I have to add that wise Oedipus was right, that we really aren‟t 
responsible for our dreams, but no more for our waking hours either, and that the 
doctrine of free will has as its mother and father human pride and the human feeling 
of power? 
105
   
 
Nietzsche conceives the dreamer on the model of the figure of Oedipus with the dream itself 
as analogous to a tragicomic work of art. The critical bite of the aphorism comes from 
Nietzsche‟s attempt to expose the hubris involved in seeking to attribute to ourselves the 
power of auto-genesis, “conceiving of ourselves as both mother and father to ourselves, so to 
speak, we engage in a comic, childish self-inflation designed to satisfy our Machtgefühl.”106  
Here the self imagines itself to be completely self-sufficient and conducting the dream of self-
authorship. The dangers of leading such an existence are manifold and include what Michael 
Ure calls a series of “intersubjective pathologies,” such as melancholia and revenge. We see 
in this and other sections from book two of Dawn two important features of Nietzsche‟s 
understanding of the self at this time:  (a) the psychological claim that the fantasy of auto-
genesis is in fact symptomatic of a desire for narcissistic plenitude; and (b) the idea that 
careful self-cultivation is the only therapeutic response that can work against the pathological 
affects borne of narcissistic loss.
107
   
 
 
Conclusion 
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In Dawn Nietzsche‟s is a specifically ethically-motivated naturalism:  how might we relearn 
our subjectivities so that we can fashion them in ways that are more conducive to our bodily 
and spiritual well-being and flourishing and that does not assume what “morality” assumes 
and demands?   What is now required, Nietzsche argues, even in the domain of psychological 
observation, which hitherto has been associated with a frivolous spirit, is a “persistent 
labouring that does not tire of piling stone upon stone, pebble upon pebble,” and here one 
needs the moderate courage not to be ashamed of such “modest work” and to defy all 
contempt for it.
108
 For Nietzsche the prejudices and presumptions of morality are the target to 
be attacked because they assume knowledge that he thinks we simply do not have and only 
serve to prevent such knowledge from being developed.   Although the goal is ultimately, we 
might say, one of autonomy – Nietzsche says the task is not to allow oneself to be the 
happenstance one factually is - Nietzsche‟s conception of this is more modest, more 
experimental, and more uniquely individual than what we find in Kant.  
In the conclusion let me say something about Nietzsche‟s relation to Kant. In Dawn 
Kant, we find, is praised over other moral philosophers, especially Schopenhauer, for 
esteeming reason over sentiment in ethics and for standing outside the modern movement 
with its emphasis on defining morality in terms of the sympathetic affects.
109
 The problem, 
Nietzsche says in Dawn section 339, is that Kant demands that duty “must always be 
something of a burden,” never habit and custom, and in this demand “there is concealed a 
remnant of ascetic cruelty.”110 So, one of Nietzsche‟s interests in ethics is that duty should 
cease being a burden and he has the hope that after long practice it can become instead a 
pleasurable inclination and a need in which the rights of others to whom our duties, and now 
our inclinations, refer become occasions of pleasant feelings for us. And it is clear that 
Nietzsche thinks the ethical task of achieving self-control and self-mastery, which involves 
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long practice and much daily work, will be made more appealing if it is construed 
aesthetically:  one can take pleasure, even delight, in such an exercise and use the full range 
of one‟s senses and reason.   
Nietzsche differs from Kant, then, in placing the emphasis on autonomy being a 
radically individualised task, a duty that he hopes can become a joy. As he will later put it in 
The Anti-Christ, “A virtue needs to be our own invention, our own most personal need and 
self-defence: in any other sense, a virtue is just dangerous...The most basic laws of 
preservation and growth…require that everyone should invent his own virtues, his own 
categorical imperatives.” 111  Like Kant, Nietzsche wants us to be astute agents of reason 
which involves mastering the affects, working against fanaticism, and attaining the modesty 
of self-control.
112
 Unlike Kant, he thinks moral therapy needs to be directed more pertinently 
at the particular drives and capacities of individuals, and not presented as an overly 
rationalistic and universalistic model.  For Nietzsche, Kant, we might say, assumes too much: 
he assumes a moral autonomy that is independent of the actual psychological and existential 
tasks necessary to carry it out, including the material to be worked on, and the division 
between heteronomy and autonomy is drawn too radically. Kantian autonomy does not rest on 
self-love and, in fact, requires the cancellation of the self or ego: the strict command of duty 
requires self-denial, and this is what Nietzsche means when he identifies in Kant‟s ethics the 
remnants of ascetic cruelty.
113
 Nietzsche does not suppose that all persons will wish to assume 
the task of the joyful science and instead of saying we have a duty to become the ones that we 
are he wishes us to declare to ourselves, “we, however, want to become the ones that we 
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are…” 114 The task is a rather modest one: to cultivate the drives and, in so doing, give style to 
one‟s character by removing pieces of first nature and adding pieces of second nature, and 
thus fashion a self that others can behold with pleasure as opposed to a self that is plagued by 
“paranoia, guilt, and self-hatred.” 115  
Finally, what of the point I noted at the beginning of the paper concerning the 
seemingly harsh and unattractive character of Nietzsche‟s conception of ethical practice?  Let 
me end by commenting on just two points.  Firstly, an essential test to learn for Nietzsche is 
the endurance of solitude.
116
 He does not envisage this as a mode of retreat. Rather, solitude 
has the advantage of providing us with the distant perspective we need to think well of things: 
“on my own I seem to see my friends more clearly and more appealingly than when together 
with them; and at the time when I loved music most and was most sensitive to it, I loved at a 
distance from it.” 117 We need solitude “so as not to drink out of everyone‟s cisterns” for 
amongst the many we simply do not think as an “I.” Not only is such solitude of benefit to 
ourselves it also improves our relation to others; when we turn angry towards people and fear 
them we need the desert to become good again.
118
   
Secondly, Nietzsche urges us to get beyond our compassion because he appreciates 
that free thinking – such as the opening up of new ways of being ethical – will, initially at 
least, plunge people into despair and grief. For Nietzsche Mitleid is the enemy to be focused 
on because when it rules, and when suffering is seen as the greatest evil, “people lose the 
ability to endure hardship and privation as well as the attendant personal strength and 
resistance.” 119  Mitleid “saps the capacity to inflict suffering as well as to endure it.” 120 For 
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Nietzsche, the achievement of greatness, especially in the unflinching pursuit of knowledge, 
which is his main concern in Dawn, “requires the ability to endure, inflict, and witness pain.” 
121
  As he puts it in Dawn 146, and where he presents the idea of a new ploughshare, “if, with 
regard to ourselves, we do not heed, in narrow, petty-bourgeois fashion, immediate 
consequences and sufferings: why should we have to do so with our neighbour?”122  In 
making this sacrifice, in which we and our neighbours are included, the aim, he says, is to 
“strengthen and elevate the general feeling of human power (Macht)” and, in this way, seek to 
effect a positive increase in happiness.
123
  By “sacrifice” here Nietzsche means sacrifice to the 
cause of humanity‟s existential and moral enlightenment.  We should note: free spirits try to 
entice others to see themselves as experiments and as sacrifices; moreover, we should only 
sacrifice our neighbour to the extent that we are prepared to sacrifice ourselves.   
 
Supposing we went in for self-sacrifice: what would prohibit us from sacrificing our 
neighbor as well? – just as state and prince have forever done when they sacrificed 
one citizen to the other “in the universal public interest”, as they put it. But we too 
have universal, perhaps more universal interests: why shouldn‟t some individuals 
from the current generation be sacrificed for future generations? Such that those 
individuals‟ grief, their restlessness, their despair, their blunderings and fearful 
footsteps be deemed necessary because a new ploughshare is to cleave the ground, 
rendering it fruitful for all? 
124
 
 
 
I think it is clear, both from hints he gives in Dawn and says in other texts, that 
Nietzsche thinks the tasks of free-spirited thinking are ones reserved, and perhaps best 
reserved, for a few individuals and who will constitute what we might choose to call a moral 
(or “immoral”) avant-garde.   
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